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THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX: A NEGOTIATED 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR THE 
REMEDIATIQN OF THE GENERAL 
ELECTRICIHOUSATONIC RIVER SITE ENSURES 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND ECONOMIC 
PROSPERITY FOR PITTSFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS 
Michaela S. Moore* 
The remediation of highly contaminated industrial sites is custom-
arily conducted under RCRA or CERCLA. Because of a desire 
for less draconian measures and more expeditious cleanups, those 
involved with these contaminated sites began to look for alterna-
tives to the federal programs. One such alternative, the negoti-
ated settlement, was used at the General Electric/Housatonic 
River Site in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. This Comment argues 
that the negotiated settlement is the best alternative for imple-
menting remediation at the General Electric site because it will 
ensure that the cleanup is conducted safely and efficiently and 
that the site can be quickly redeveloped. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1903, the General Electric Company (GE) opened its doors in 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts.1 The main function of this operation was 
building transformers for utilities.2 At its height, the GE plant in 
Pittsfield employed over 13,000 people, dominating the local economy 
of this western Massachusetts city.3 However, foreign competition, 
which resulted in million-dollar losses, forced GE to shut down its 
* Production Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1998-1999. 
1 See William M. Carley, A Lot of Anger Out There, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,1997, at AI. 
2 See id. 
3 See Michael Cohen, EPA Invokes Superfund to Force GE to Clean Up Pollution, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1998; at B2. 
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transformer operations in the late 1980s.4 Currently, GE maintains 
only a plastics division in Pittsfield, which employs about 700 people.5 
Although GE has, for the most part, vacated the Pittsfield area, it 
has left a lasting legacy in the form of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) 
contamination.6 From 1932 to 1977, GE used PCBs as insulating fluids 
in the manufacture of its transformers.7 During this time, GE disposed 
of the PCB waste in accordance with the legal industry standard-
on-site disposal and release into the nearby Housatonic River.s 
In 1979, Congress completely banned the use of PCBs, declaring 
them a suspected carcinogen in humans based upon the results of a 
number of animal tests.9 Although GE discontinued using PCBs in 
accordance with the law, decades of dumping this now suspected 
carcinogen left the plant area and the Housatonic River heavily con-
taminated.lO In 1981, GE acknowledged its responsibility for the PCB 
contamination and entered into a consent agreement with state and 
federal regulators under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) and various state laws.u Since that time, GE has spent 
over $100 million to investigate and remediate contamination at its 
Pittsfield plant and the surrounding areas.12 
The propriety of the RCRA process of remediation was questioned 
during the 1996 senatorial contest between incumbent Senator John 
F. Kerry (D-Mass.) and then-Governor of Massachusetts William F. 
Weld.13 In their efforts to appear friendly to the environment and 
4 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI; General Electric, GE in Pittsfield, (visited Jan. 20, 1998) 
<http://www.ge.com/pittsfieldlinfo.htm> [hereinafter GE in Pittsfieldl. 
5 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI. 
6 See id. 
7 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4 (because PCBs are not flammable, their use was required 
in transformers by many safety and fire codes, as well as by insurance underwriters). 
8 See William J. Angelo, Big Profits, Big Bills: For Three Decades General Electric Co. Has 
Been Cleaning Up Thxic Leftovers at Two Sites, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Aug. 11, 1997, at 
44; Carley, supra note 1, at AI. 
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)-(3) (1994). In 1977, Congress banned the manufacture, processing, 
distribution in commerce, or use of PCBs after January 1, 1978, unless such activities were 
carried out in a totally enclosed manner, as determined by EPA. See id. After July 1, 1979, 
Congress specified that no person could process or distribute in commerce any PCB unless EPA 
granted that person an exemption. See id.; see also MITCHELL D. ERICKSON, ANALYTICAL 
CHEMISTRY OF PCBs 5 (2d ed. 1997); Angelo, supra note 8, at 44. 
10 See Angelo, supra note 8, at 44; Carley, supra note 1, at AI. 
11 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994); Angelo, supra note 8, at 44; 
GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4; 'Irudy Tynan, Deadly Soil Undermines Small Thwn's Serenity; 
GE Scrambles to Find, Cleanse PCB Pollution That It Spread, DENVER POST, July 10, 1997, 
at A27. 
12 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
13 See Weld Turns Up Heat on GE River Cleanup, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1996, at BlO 
[hereinafter Weld Turns Up Heatl. 
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tough on the "big businesses" that pollute it, both Kerry and Weld 
focused their attention on the GE site in Pittsfield. 14 Because it is the 
one highly contaminated site in Massachusetts that is owned by the 
quintessential ''big business" corporation, the GE site became an 
obvious political target.15 Both Weld and Kerry called for tougher 
action to be taken against GE in the form of a "Superfund" designa-
tion-placing the site on the National Priorities List (NPL) under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).16 
The RCRA process came under fire again in the summer of 1997, 
when many Pittsfield residents discovered that their yards were con-
taminated with PCBs by yard fill that GE gave to employees and the 
city of Pittsfield free of charge during the 1940s and 1950sY Adding 
insult to injury, information surfaced that a retired GE engineer had 
warned the company about the fill problems as early as 1981.18 Upon 
discovering that their property, their school yards, and their play-
grounds were contaminated with PCBs and that this fact may have 
been hidden from them by GE, the residents of Pittsfield called for 
state and federal authorities to take a tougher stance against GE to 
compel a more expeditious cleanup.19 
Together, these two developments were the impetus that led to the 
proposed listing of the GE plant as a Superfund site.20 On September 
25, 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to 
add the GE/Housatonic River Site to the NPL under CERCLA.21 The 
proposed Superfund designation opened up a notice and comment 
period during which EPA invited all interested parties to submit their 
written comments concerning the placement of the GE/Housatonic 
River Site on the NPL.22 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (1994); Weld Turns Up Heat, supra note 13, at BIO. 
17 See Tynan, supra note 11, at A27; A Polluter Disguised as Benefactor, HARTFORD Cou-
RIER, Sept. 18, 1997, at A26. 
18 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI; Theo Stein, River Restoration Rewards Environmentalists' 
Campaign, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Oct 26, 1998, at 16. 
19 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI; Tynan, supra note 11, at A27. 
20 See Weld Turns Up Heat, supra note 13, at BIO; Tynan, supra note 11, at A27; A Polluter 
Disguised as Benefactor, supra note 17, at A26. 
21 See 62 Fed. Reg. 50,450, 50,454 (1997). 
22 See id. at 50,452; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1994). 
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In light of ongoing negotiations between EPA's Intergovernmental 
Team and representatives from GE, EPA extended the notice and 
comment period numerous times.23 EPA formed this partnership with 
several state and federal agencies in order to achieve a comprehensive 
solution to the environmental problems at the Pittsfield site.24 The 
Intergovernmental Team attempted to negotiate a solution with GE 
in lieu of a final listing of the site on the NPL.25 These negotiations 
collapsed on April 6, 1998, and EPA regional administrator, John 
DeVillars, announced that EPA will designate the GEIHousatonic 
River Site as a federal Superfund site.26 
Despite this ominous threat from EPA, many people, including 
various Pittsfield city officials and then-Acting Governor Paul Cel-
lucci, called for the negotiations between the Intergovernmental 
Team and GE to continue.27 In June 1998, EPA delayed the Superfund 
designation and talks between the two groups resumed.28 On Septem-
ber 24, 1998, these talks culminated in a negotiated settlement agree-
ment between GE and the Intergovernmental Team for remediating 
the GE/Housatonic River Site.29 Under the settlement, GE agreed to 
clean up the approximately 250 acre former plant site and turn por-
tions of it over to the newly-established Pittsfield Economic Develop-
ment Authority (PEDA) for redevelopment.3o GE agreed to remove 
23 See 62 Fed. Reg. 60,199, 60,199 (1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 10,582, 10,582 (1998). The Intergovern-
mental Team is comprised of EPA representatives, the Massachusetts Department of Environ-
mental Protection, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, the Massa-
chusetts Attorney General's Office, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, 
the Connecticut Attorney General's Office, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice. See id. 
24 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,199. 
25 See id. 
26 See Cohen, supra note 3, at B2. 
27 See Peter J. Howe, EPA Chief Prefers Talks with GE on PCB Cleanup, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 31,1998, at B9 [hereinafter PCB Cleanup]; Matthew Falconer, Call to Delay EPA Action 
on GE Criticized, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1998, at B5. 
28 See PCB Cleanup, supra note 27, at B9; Falconer, supra note 27, at B5; EPA Pushes for 
Plan to Clean PCB Pollution; Seeks Deal with GE on Pittsfield Problem, PATRIOT LEDGER, 
Sept. 15, 1998, at 7 [hereinafter EPA Pushes for Plan]. 
29 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY OF AGREEMENT: GENERAL ELEC-
TRICIPITTSFIELD-HOUSATONIC RIVER SITES (1998); Scott Allen & Peter Howe, GE Accepts 
$150M Plan to Clean Pittsfield Sites, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1998, at AI; David Stout, GE 
Agrees to Clean Part of Tainted River in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at AI; GE 
to Pay $150 Million to $200 Million to Clean Up New England River, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 
1998, at A5. 
30 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 2-3, 8; Allen & Howe, supra note 
29, at AI. 
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contaminated sediments from the one-half mile of the Housatonic 
River nearest the GE plant.3! Through a cost-sharing agreement, GE 
also agreed to fund much of the anticipated cost of an additional 
mile-and-one-half of river cleanup to be conducted by EPA.32 In addi-
tion, GE agreed to pay $15 million in damages to be used for a number 
of projects designed to acquire or enhance wildlife habitat.33 This 
settlement will benefit both the environmental and economic health 
of the city of Pittsfield by expediting the cleanup and focusing on the 
redevelopment of the former plant site. 
This Comment will explore the advantages of a negotiated settle-
ment as opposed to conducting the cleanup under a federal statutory 
regime such as RCRA or CERCLA. Section I of this Comment dis-
cusses PCBs and the extent of PCB contamination at GE's Pittsfield 
site. Section II examines the various pieces of federal legislation that 
have governed or could have governed the cleanup at the GE/Housa-
tonic River Site. Section III discusses the various criticisms sur-
rounding CERCLA. Section IV explores some alternatives to imple-
menting remediation under CERCLA. Section V discusses the 
applicability of these alternatives to the GE/Housatonic River Site. 
Section VI looks at the novel alternative implemented by GE and 
EPA's Intergovernmental Team-the negotiated settlement-and 
discusses why this was the best possible outcome for the city of 
Pittsfield. 
I. PCB CONTAMINATION IN PITTSFIELD 
A. Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) 
Polychlorinated biphenyls, more commonly known as PCBs, are a 
class of 209 discrete chemical compounds, called congeners, in which 
one to ten chlorine atoms are attached to bipheny1,34 PCBs were 
discovered before the turn of the century and were widely used 
for industrial purposes between 1930 and 1977 because of their chemi-
cal and physical stability and their electrical insulating properties.35 
31 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6; Allen & Howe, supra note 29, 
at AI. 
32 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6-7; Allen & Howe, supra note 
29, at AI. 
33 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 8. 
34 See ERICKSON, supra note 9, at 2. 
35 See id. at 2, 5; ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 140, POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS 
AND 'l'ERPHENYLS 21 (2d ed. 1993). 
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PCBs were used primarily as dielectric and heat-exchange fluids in 
capacitors and transformers, but were also used in printing inks, 
paints, dedusting agents, pesticides, and a variety of other products.36 
Although the chemical and physical stability of PCBs made their 
commercial use advantageous, these properties are the cause of the 
present environmental contamination problems.37 The use of PCBs in 
such products as inks and pesticides resulted in widespread, low-level 
releases into the environment.38 The use of PCBs as insulating fluids 
within transformers and other electrical equipment resulted in rela-
tively high, locally concentrated environmental releases due to spills, 
improper handling, or improper disposal. 39 Since PCBs do not readily 
degrade in the environment, they tend to bioaccumulate after such 
releases or disposals.40 As a result, although U.S. production of PCBs 
ceased in 1977, they are still present in the environment because of 
their high persistence and chemical and physical stability.41 
Accordingly, most humans have been and will continue to be ex-
posed to PCBs.42 Today, the major source of PCB exposure in the 
general environment is the redistribution of PCBs previously intro-
duced through various releases and disposals.43 Most people whose 
blood serum has been analyzed for PCBs have been found to have 
from trace amounts to about thirty parts per billion (ppb) in their 
blood, with the mean level being ten ppb.44 
When humans are acutely exposed to PCBs, either through the 
consumption of contaminated food or through inhalation and skin 
absorption in the work environment, toxic effects may occur.4S The 
effects of exposure through consumption of contaminated food in-
clude a severe, persistent form of acne known as chloracne, fatigue, 
nausea, swelling, disturbed vision, skin lesions, and neurological prob-
lems.46 The effects of exposure through inhalation and skin absorption 
36 See ERICKSON, supra note 9, at 2. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 140, supra note 35, at 26; ERICKSON, supra note 
9, at 5. 
42 See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 140, supra note 35, at 444. 
43 See id. at 24. 
44 See ERICKSON, supra note 9, at 55. 
45 See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 140, supra note 35, at 21. 
46 See id. at 444-51. The presence of these symptoms in humans was noted in two accidents, 
the Yusho accident in Japan and the Yu-Cheng accident in Taiwan, when rice oil contaminated 
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in the workplace include skin rash and irritation, itching, burning 
sensations, and irritation of the conjunctiva.47 Furthermore, numerous 
studies on rodents have revealed that some congeners of PCBs may 
be carcinogenic and that they can promote the carcinogenicity of other 
chemicals.48 However, there are presently no epidemiological studies 
available that provide conclusive evidence of an association between 
PCB exposure and increased cancer mortality.49 
The lack of conclusive information concerning the effects of PCBs 
on humans is largely due to the many problems presented by the 
toxicological evaluation of PCBs.50 First, since commercial PCBs are 
often contaminated with other toxins such as polychorinated dibenzo-
furans (PCDFs), it is difficult to determine which effects are attrib-
utable to the PCBs themselves versus the much more toxic PCDFs.51 
Second, much of the data on the toxicity of PCBs is based on the 
testing of different mixtures of congeners in which PCBs occur.52 Yet, 
some constituents of these mixtures are more easily degraded in 
the environment than others.53 As a result, employees who regularly 
worked with PCBs were likely exposed to mixtures different from 
those to which the general population may currently be exposed, 
making a toxicological evaluation of one group inapplicable to the 
other.54 This indicates that there is a need for data concerning the 
toxicity of the PCBs that are actually present in a specific contami-
nated area to determine the possible dangers. 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) compiled 
such data in "The Housatonic River Area PCB Exposure Assess-
ment."55 MDPH conducted this study on residents of the area around 
with high levels of PCBs poisoned thousands of people. See id. However, the oil did contain other 
toxic substances such as polychlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDFs), making it difficult to deter-
mine what effects were attributable to PCBs as opposed to the more toxic PCDFs. See id. at 
444,446,449-50. In fact, several Japanese research groups have concluded that the main signs 
and symptoms in the Yusho intoxications were caused mainly by contaminants in the PCB 
mixture, namely PCDFs. See id. at 455-56. 
47 See id. at 456-67. 
48 See id. at 21. 
49 See id. at 40. 
60 See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 140, supra note 35, at 444. 
6} See id. at 39; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
52 See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 140, supra note 35, at 39. 
53 See id. 
64 See id. 
55 See generally BUREAU OF ENVTL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT, MASSACHUSE'ITS DEP'T OF PUB. 
HEALTH, THE FINAL REPORT ON THE HOUSATONIC RIVER AREA PCB EXPOSURE ASSESS-
MENT AND RELATED HEALTH ISSUES (1997) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
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the GE site in Pittsfield and the Housatonic River to determine 
whether various activities contributed to higher serum PCB levels.56 
The study consisted of two segments, the Exposure Prevalence Study 
and the Volunteer Study.57 In the Exposure Prevalence Study, sixty-
nine individuals with the highest potential for exposure to PCBs, 
based on screening questionnaire scores, received a blood test.58 In 
the Volunteer Study, seventy-nine residents concerned about PCB 
exposure, but not invited to participate in the Exposure Prevalence 
Study, had their blood tested.69 
MDPH found that the average serum level among nonoccupation-
ally exposed participants was 4.49 ppb for those in the Exposure 
Prevalence Study and 5.77 ppb for those in the Volunteer Study.60 
These levels are within the normal background range for nonoccupa-
tionally exposed individuals.61 It does not appear that the residents of 
the Housatonic River Area are experiencing higher levels of PCBs in 
their blood due to PCB contamination of the GE plant, the Housatonic 
River, and the surrounding areas.62 The study also stated that pre-
vious studies conducted by MDPH showed that exposure through soil 
contact alone did not result in appreciable increases in serum PCB 
levels, thus addressing the concerns of residents who may have con-
taminated soil on their property.63 
However, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office criticized 
GE for misusing the information in this and other studies to downplay 
the potential adverse health effects of PCBs on humans.64 The Attor-
56 See id. at 2. The Housatonic River Area comprises eight communities in Berkshire County, 
Massachusetts: Dalton, Great Barrington, Lanesborough, Lee, Lenox, Pittsfield, Sheffield, and 
Stockbridge. See id. 
57 See id. at 3. 
68 See id. For the Exposure Prevalence Study, 800 households were randomly chosen from 
among all those located within one-half mile of the Housatonic River (400 from Pittsfield and 
400 from the other seven communities of the "Housatonic River Area" which border the river 
downstream) to answer a questionnaire evaluating the potential of household members for PCB 
exposure based on their activities. See id. Those households with the greatest potential for PCB 
exposure received the highest scores and were offered the opportunity for a blood test. See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 4. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 5. 
64 See Michael Cohen, Harshbarger Panel Accuses GE of Misusing PCB Studies, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1998, at B4. Another study which the Attorney General's Office accused GE of 
misusing was one conducted by Dr. David Wegman of the University of Massachusetts at 
Lowell. See id. This study looked at GE workers who had died of cancer over a 15-year period. 
See id. The Attorney General's Office says that GE's quoting of the Wegman study as failing to 
find an association between PCBs and excess cancer risk among GE employees is out of context. 
See id. 
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ney General's Office asserted that scientists and physicians who re-
viewed MDPH's "Housatonic River Area PCB Exposure Assess-
ment" found indications that there could be serious risks to Pittsfield 
residents from environmental exposure to PCBs.65 Unfortunately, this 
debate merely affirms the fact that even in studies conducted on the 
specific contaminated area, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine whether or not PCB exposure results in a substantial health 
risk. 
B. Contamination at the General Electric/Housatonic River Site 
in Jlitts~elti 
The GE manufacturing facility, located at 100 Woodlawn Avenue in 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, comprises approximately 250 acres of land 
containing approximately 5 million square feet of buildings.66 The 
various RCRA corrective action permit orders, under which GE had 
been implementing cleanup, broke down the GE property into a num-
ber of "sites" which include various areas of the GE property and the 
nearby Housatonic River.67 
The PCB contamination at the GE plant site is extensive.68 The 
approximately 250 acres contain at least sixteen PCB disposal sites.69 
In 1996, testing of these sites turned up a hot spot known as Building 
68, where a 1000 gallon tank of PCBs imploded in the late 1960s, 
contaminating the riverbank and surrounding sediment.7o GE imme-
diately cleaned up the spill, but PCB counts now average 7550 parts 
per million (ppm) in the riverbank and 1550 ppm in the sediment.71 
This is an example of one of the more contaminated PCB disposal sites 
on the G E property.72 
65 See id. 
66 See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, ADMINISTRATIVE CONSENT ORDER 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANy-PITTSFIELD FACILITY 2 (1990). 
67 See id. at 2-4. Sites are identified geographically within the consent pennitslorders as East 
Street Area 1 Site, East Street Area 2 Site, GE Facility, GE Facility (Remainder) Site, Hill 78 
Area Site, Unkamet Brok Area Site and any other place or area where uncontrolled oil and/or 
hazardous waste material emanating from the properties is located. See id. Accordingly, new 
site names are established as contaminated areas are discovered. See id. These site names may 
be referred to in this Comment only to distinguish between remedial actions, and their actual 
geographic location is not important to the understanding of this Comment. See id. 
68 See Angelo, supra note 8, at 44. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
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Not only are the areas in and around the GE plant site heavily 
contaminated, but the Housatonic River itself shows high levels of 
PCBs.73 GE's own 1983 study concluded that about 39,000 pounds of 
PCBs permeate Housatonic sediments, with seventy percent of the 
contaminates located between the plant and Woods Pond, which is 
twelve miles south.74 Another twenty percent has been found in the 
pond, with the rest of the contamination stretching to the Connecticut 
border and beyond.75 The Housatonic River eventually empties into 
Long Island Sound about 200 miles downstream. 76 
The contamination does not end here, however, as yard fill given 
away by GE in the 1940s and 1950s contaminated many residential 
properties, as well as playgrounds and school yards, with PCBs.77 The 
extent of contamination at these sites has varied, with many residen-
tial properties containing PCB levels from 1000 ppm to a high of 
44,000 ppm.78 Although the actual potential danger depends on the 
mode of human contact, a PCB level of ten ppm in the soil is consid-
ered evidence of an imminent hazard under Massachusetts stand-
ards.79 GE has voluntarily cleaned up about thirty sites, including two 
schools and a park,80 GE plans to remediate about sixty other sites, 
at an estimated cost of $20 million.81 Since May 1998, EPA has fielded 
about forty more requests for PCB testing on residential properties, 
leaving uncertainty as to how many more contaminated properties 
exist.82 
II. THE STATUTORY REGIMES USED AND CONSIDERED FOR 
IMPLEMENTING CLEANUP AT THE GE/HoUSATONIC RIVER SITE 
A. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to establish a comprehensive fed-
eral policy for waste management to respond to the vastly increased 
volume of hazardous waste that was posing a threat to human health 
and the environment.83 Prior to the enactment of RCRA, the collection 
73 See Angelo, supra note 8, at 44. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI; Tynan, supra note 11, at A27. 
78 See Tynan, supra note 11, at A27. 
79 See id. 
80 See EPA Pushes for Plan, supra note 28, at 7. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994); William L. Kovacs & John F. 
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and disposal of solid waste was primarily a state or local issue.84 
RCRA sought to change federal policy relating to solid waste man-
agement from a limited role of research and development to one of 
direct federal involvement.85 
RCRA's purpose is threefold: (1) to provide guidance and funding 
for resource recovery projects developed by the states; (2) to encour-
age solid waste planning by the states; and (3) to mandate federal 
regulation of hazardous waste.86 RCRA accomplishes these objectives 
both by establishing minimum standards applicable to all who gener-
ate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes and by 
offering financial and technical assistance to states which voluntarily 
develop and implement a solid waste management plan that fulfills its 
threefold purpose.87 Accordingly, under RCRA, each state is ulti-
mately responsible for implementing its own program to deal with 
hazardous waste situations, as long as that program meets the federal 
minimum standards.88 
Subsection C of RCRA is the portion of the statute that regulates 
the management of hazardous waste and mandates that EPA prom-
ulgate criteria and regulations for identifying and listing hazardous 
wastes.89 To qualify for regulation under RCRA, a waste must be 
identified as a solid, hazardous waste.90 Once identified, EPA can 
regulate the solid, hazardous waste in accordance with the regulations 
promulgated under RCRA.91 
Pursuant to Subsection C of RCRA, all persons generating or 
transporting hazardous waste, and all owners or operators of hazard-
ous waste treatment, storage, or disposal (TSD) facilities, must man-
age their hazardous waste in accordance with the strict minimum 
standards promulgated by EPA.92 The primary focus ofthis section of 
the statute and the applicable regulations is on active TSD facilities 
Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 205-07 (1977). 
84 See Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 83, at 205. 
85 See id. at 221. 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 6902; Roger W. Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 633, 635 (1978). 
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 6902; Andersen, supra note 86, at 635; Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 83, at 
221-22. 
88 See Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 83, at 223. 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a)-(b). 
90 See id. §§ 6002(a), 6903(5), (27). 
91 See id. § 6921(a)-(b). 
92 See id. §§ 6922-6924; William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination 
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, arid the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35, 
66 (1995). 
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that currently treat, store, and dispose of hazardous wastes.93 How-
ever, EPA may still identify a nonactive site as a "storage" or "dis-
posal" facility because RCRA considers hazardous wastes to be stored 
where previously disposed of or discarded.94 
The "cradle-to-grave" regulatory system created by RCRA prohib-
its any treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste without a 
permit.95 An applicant can only obtain a TSD permit if it demonstrates 
that it will conduct treatment, storage, or disposal activities in com-
pliance with numerous standards.96 The most important of which is 
the requirement that the applicant conduct corrective action in re-
sponse to releases of hazardous waste.97 
Corrective action under RCRA involves the cleanup of hazardous 
waste released from a TSD facility.98 Once EPA has identified a TSD 
facility that may be in need of corrective action, it will perform a 
RCRA Facility Assessment (RFA).99 If the RFA shows that there has 
been or may be a release of hazardous waste, EPA will require the 
owner or operator of the TSD facility to perform a RCRA Facility 
Investigation (RFl).lOO The RFI identifies the extent and the nature 
of the contamination at the site. lOl EPA uses the results of the RFI to 
determine whether a cleanup is necessary.l02 If EPA decides that a 
cleanup is necessary, the TSD facility must undertake a Corrective 
Measures Study (CMS).lo3 The CMS identifies possible remedies and 
evaluates their cost and effectiveness. 104 After reviewing the CMS, 
EPA will approve one of the alternatives and the owner or operator 
of the TSD facility will implement the required corrective action. lo5 
93 See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,978, 23,981 (1988); Buzbee, supra note 92, at 66. 
94 See 42 U.S.C § 6928(h); Buzbee, supra note 92, at 66. 
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a); J. Stanton Curry et al., The Tug-of-War Between RCRA and 
CERCLA at Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 359, 363 (1991). 
96 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1998); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 363. 
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u), (v); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 363. 
98 See Curry et al., supra note 95, at 364. 
99 See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,810 (1990); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 376; Ian G. John, Tho 
Much Waste: A Proposal for Change in the Government's Effort to Clean Up the Nation, 70 
IND. L.J. 951, 963 (1995). 
\00 See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,810-13; Curry et al., supra note 95, at 376; John, supra note 99, at 
964. 
\01 See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,810-13; Curry et al., supra note 95, at 376; John, supra note 99, at 
964. 
102 See John, supra note 99, at 964. 
\03 See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,813-23; Curry et al., supra note 95, at 377; John, supra note 99, at 
964. 
104 See Curry et al., supra note 95, at 377; John, supra note 99, at 964-65. 
105 See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,834-38; Curry et al., supra note 95, at 377; John, supra note 99, at 
966. 
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The owner or operator must conduct this remediation as a condition 
of receiving or maintaining a TSD Permit.lo6 However, the owner or 
operator of the TSD facility may seek judicial review of any EPA 
action in "issuing, denying, modifying, or revoking any permit" under 
RCRA.lo7 Furthermore, interested parties may seek judicial review 
of any final regulations promulgated under RCRA.108 The applicable 
standard of review, as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act, 
permits the courts to set aside only those EPA decisions that are 
arbitrary and capricious. lo9 Because RCRA corrective actions are part 
of the permitting process, EPA decisions in such matters are imme-
diately reviewable.llo 
In 1984, Congress, through the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments (HSWA), substantially expanded RCRA corrective action 
authorities with the addition of sections 6924(u), 6924(v), 6928(h) and 
the amendment of section 6973.111 "Section 6924(u) requires every 
TSD facility seeking a RCRA permit to undertake corrective action 
for any release of a 'hazardous waste or constituent[]' from any 'solid 
waste management unit,' regardless of when a waste was placed in 
the unit."112 Section 6924(v) requires every TSD facility seeking a 
RCRA permit to undertake corrective action for any release of a 
hazardous waste beyond the facility's boundaries unless the owner of 
the affected property does not consent to the corrective action.113 
Finally, section 6928(h) "authorizes the EPA to order any interim 
status facility that releases a hazardous waste into the environment 
to undertake a corrective action or any other response action the EPA 
deems necessary to protect human health or the environment."114 The 
addition of these sections vastly expanded the reach of EPA and gave 
106 See Curry et al., supra note 95, at 363, 378. 
107 Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (1994); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 386. 
lOB See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 386. 
109 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 386. 
110 See 42 U .S.C. § 6976; Curry et al., supra note 95, at 386. 
III See Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u), (v), 
6928(h), 6972, 6973 (1994»; Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 365. 
112 Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 365. 
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(v); Curry et al., supra note 95, at 366. 
114 Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 366; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h). In order to avoid a situation 
where an existing hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facility would have to stop 
operations, Congress provided a special "interim status" for existing operations to continue, 
pending the receipt of a permit. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e); Joseph F. Guida, Corrective Action 
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 44 Sw. L.J. 1331, 1335 (1991). The addition 
of § 6928(h) allowed EPA to order such facilities to undertake a corrective action. See Curry et 
al., supra note 95, at 366. 
590 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:577 
it the power to regulate and order remediation at virtually all con-
taminated sites.1l5 
As amended, section 6973(a) allows EPA to bring a court action 
against a past or present generator, transporter, or owner or operator 
of a TSD facility who has contributed or is contributing to any han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid, hazard-
ous waste that may present "an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to human health or the environment."1l6 The "imminent 
endangerment" provision requires the presence of a continuing en-
dangerment in order to receive relief.1l7 Accordingly, although a court 
action by EPA may be effective for dealing with active sites where 
"imminent" hazardous wastes exist, additional measures, beyond the 
scope of RCRA, were needed to regulate cleanup, damages, and com-
pensation of abandoned and inactive sites.1l8 
On May 27, 1981, GE entered into its first consent agreement with 
state and federal environmental agencies under RCRA to begin the 
remediation process. ll9 Pursuant to that agreement, GE completed an 
extensive study of PCBs in the river system, evaluated various re-
medial options, and implemented those options selected by the agen-
cies. 120 In 1990, GE entered into consent orders with the Massachu-
setts Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) covering the 
Housatonic River, Silver Lake, the GE plant, and former oxbOWS.121 
These consent orders called for comprehensive site investigations, 
risk assessments, and studies of potential remedial measures, as well 
as several short-term measures. l22 In 1991, EPA issued a RCRA cor-
rective action permit covering essentially the same sites as the MDEP 
consent orders and the same series of steps.123 However, since that 
permit contained no provision for coordination between EPA and 
MDEP, GE and the state of Massachusetts appealed the permit to 
115 See Curry et al., supra note 95, at 365-66. 
116 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (authorizing EPA to compel cleanups at facilities requiring corrective 
action even if they do not have TSD permits). 
117Id. 
118 See Barbara L. Barber, The Supreme Court "Missed the Forest for the Trees" in Meghrig 
v. KFC Western, Inc., 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 109, 114 (1996). 
119 See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 66, at 1. 
120 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
121 See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 66, at 1-5 (issued pursu-
ant to MA Gen. Laws ch. 21E). 
122 See id. at 5-15. 
123 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PERMIT UNDER THE HAZARDOUS AND 
SOLID WASTE AMENDMENTS OF 1984 (1991). 
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ensure coordination.124 As a result, EPA and MDEP entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreeing to coordinate their 
efforts.125 EPA issued a revised RCRA permit in December 1993, 
which became effective in January 1994.126 
During these first thirteen years, the RCRA process was criticized 
for allowing GE to appeal each corrective action decision made by 
EPA.127 Furthermore, many people felt RCRA dictated a seemingly 
endless series of studies that never seemed to find the worst areas of 
contamination.128 Residents of Pittsfield argued that, under RCRA, 
more testing and legal wrangling occurred than did actual cleanup.129 
Some actual remediation began, however, under the RCRA permit 
that became effective in January 1994.130 Under this RCRA corrective 
action permit, GE removed approximately 14,098 tons of contami-
nated soil from the Pittsfield area.131 The removed soil came not only 
from the plant area, but also from surrounding contaminated proper-
ties, as mandated by section 6924(v) of RCRA.132 GE rebuilt Woods 
Pond Dam and assisted in the reconstruction of Rising Pond Dam on 
the Housatonic River to prevent downstream migration of PCBS.133 
GE also removed contaminated soil and installed an engineered cap 
at the Allendale School in Pittsfield, and installed a second cap at a 
former GE landfill to eliminate public exposure to PCBs.134 GE en-
gaged in oil recovery in and around the plant site and installed a new 
groundwater oil recovery system.135 To deal with the contamination of 
the various residential properties, GE voluntarily cleaned up about 
thirty sites, resulting in the removal of nearly 100,000 tons of soil.136 
124 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
125 See id. 
126 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PERMIT UNDER THE HAZARDOUS AND SOLID 
WASTE AMENDMENTS OF 1984 (1994) (permit is effective until Feb. 11, 2001) [hereinafter 
PERMIT]. 
127 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (1994); Curry et a!., supra note 95, at 
386; Angelo, supra note 8, at 44. 
128 See Theo Stein, Breakthrough on PCBs: EPA, GE Accord Yields Hope for Region's Revi-
talization, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Breakthrough on PCBs]. 
129 See id. 
130 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
131 See id. 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(v) (requiring a TSD facility to undertake corrective action for any 
release of hazardous waste that migrates beyond the facility's boundaries); see also GE in 
Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
133 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id.; Allen & Howe, supra note 29, at AI; EPA Pushes for Plan, supra note 28, at 7. 
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GE plans to remediate about sixty other sites, at an estimated cost of 
$20 million.137 
In June 1997, at the request of local elected officials, GE proposed 
to the state and federal agencies a plan to make a fifteen-acre portion 
of its plant site available for reuse by the city of Pittsfield after GE 
tears down the buildings and completes remediation of that area.13B 
GE proposed this project as a pilot that would demonstrate how to 
implement productive reuse of the vacant portions of the 250-acre 
site.13!i After EPA proposed the GE/Housatonic River Site for Super-
fund listing, GE used this type of redevelopment proposal as a sig-
nificant bargaining chip in the negotiations.14o 
EPA proposed to add the GE/Housatonic River Site to the NPL 
under CERCLA on September 25, 1997.141 This proposal predictably 
slowed the RCRA corrective action process.142 Since the legal status 
of the site had not yet changed, cleanup was still proceeding under 
RCRA, but GE obviously wanted to slow that process to avoid spend-
ing money on RCRA remediation when it faced the possibility of a 
proposed Superfund listing.143 With such a listing, EPA would likely 
take control of the cleanup and require GE to pay the costs, and 
possibly, triple damages.144 
B. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) 
Prompted by notorious abandoned toxic waste sites such as Love 
Canal in New York, Congress passed CERCLA, commonly known as 
Superfund, in 1980.145 In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA in what 
137 See EPA Pushes for Plan, supra note 28, at 7. 
138 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
139 See id. 
140 See Peter J. Howe, EPA Chief Prefers Talks With GE on PCB Cleanup, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 31, 1998, at B9. 
141 See 62 Fed. Reg. 50,450, 50,454 (1997). 
142 See id. 
143 Robert S. Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Challenge 
of Brawnfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 95 (1995). Since remediation under 
RCRA was not yet complete, it was still possible for GE to become liable under CERCLA. See 
id. 
144 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9604, 9607(a), (c)(3). 
145 See id. §§ 9601-9675; John C. Cruden, CERCLA Overview, SA85 ALI-ABA 517, 519 (1996). 
See generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund'~ Act of 1980,8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 
(1982). 
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is collectively known as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act of 1986 (SARA).146 Congress explicitly enacted CERCLA 
to protect human health and the environment.147 CERCLA created a 
fund paid for by taxes, including taxes on chemical use, to finance 
federal enforcement and cleanups of hazardous waste sites (hence the 
name "Superfund").148 CERCLA sought to fill the gaps in the then-
existing environmental regulations by granting the federal govern-
ment the power to clean up toxic waste sites and force the responsible 
parties to pay the costS.149 
The release or substantial threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance from a vessel or at a facility by a responsible party triggers 
liability under CERCLA.150 CERCLA defines Potentially Responsi-
ble Parties (PRPs) as current owners and operators, past owners and 
operators, generators, and transporters. 151 This broad definition al-
lows the federal government to hold responsible any party who is 
associated with a piece of contaminated property and deem them fully 
liable for the cost of cleanup.152 Since CERCLA provides strict liabil-
ity, plaintiffs need not prove that a PRP's conduct was negligent.153 
Furthermore, since the courts have uniformly ruled that liability 
under CERCLA is joint and several, EPA can hold every PRP at a 
site where the harm is indivisible, individually liable for the entire 
cost of site cleanup, thus forcing PRPs to sue each other for contri-
bution.154 
When the parties responsible for a site's contamination cannot be 
identified, are recalcitrant, or are insolvent, the Superfund enables 
cleanups to be carried out by the government.155 The government will 
use Superfund monies to remediate the toxic waste site and then 
146 See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.); Cruden, supra note 145, at 519. 
147 See Scott C. Whitney, Expediting Productive Reuse of Superfund Sites: Some Legislative 
Solutions for Virginia and the Nation, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 223, 223 (1996). 
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
148 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611; Ragna Henrichs, Superfund's NPL: The Listing Process, 63 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 717, 720-21 (1989). 
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; Henrichs, supra note 148, at 719-21. 
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Cruden, supra note 145, at 527-29. 
151 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4); Cruden, supra note 145, at 529-31. 
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Berger et al., supra note 143, at 80-81. 
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32); Cruden, supra note 145, at 521-22. 
154 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); United States v. Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989); Cruden, 
supra note 145, at 522. 
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604; Cruden, supra note 145, at 523; Henrichs, supra note 148, at 749; THE 
LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION §§ 13, 18 
(Susan M. Cooke ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE]. 
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engage in cost recovery actions, whenever possible, to require respon-
sible parties to replenish the Superfund.156 When EPA can identify the 
responsible parties, it may undertake the cleanup and require the 
parties to reimburse the costs to the Superfund, or may require the 
parties to perform the cleanup themselves.157 
A listing on the NPL usually begins the formal process of remedia-
tion under CERCLA.l68 CERCLA requires the President, who dele-
gated authority to the EPA Administrator, to prepare a National 
Contingency Plan (NCP) for remediating hazardous substance re-
leases and to create a NPL of hazardous waste sites most in need of 
attention.159 EPA must update the NPL annually through informal 
rulemaking proceedings.l60 
When EPA discovers a site where a release or a threat of release 
may exist, it will place this potential NPL site in the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information 
System (CERCLIS).161 CERCLIS is a comprehensive database that 
contains the official catalog of CERCLA sites.162 To determine NPL 
eligibility for those sites listed in the CERCLIS, EPA will conduct a 
number of evaluations and assessments.16S First, EPA will conduct a 
preliminary assessment (PA), which is a low cost review of the exist-
ing information.l64 If the site presents a serious threat to health or the 
environment, EPA will begin a removal action even before listing the 
site on the NPL.165 If EPA determines that the site presents a threat 
that is not imminent, it will conduct a site inspection (SI) to collect 
additional data for calculating the site's Hazard Ranking System 
(HRS) score and to eliminate sites that do not qualify for listing on 
the NPL.166 
The HRS screening device estimates the potential hazard or risk 
presented by releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances 
156 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607; Cmden, supra note 145, at 523-25; Henrichs, supra note 148, 
at 749; THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 156, § 14, at 10. 
157 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607; Cmden, supra note 145, at 524-25. 
158 See Terry C. Clarke, A Practitioner's View o/the National Priorities List, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 
57, 63 (1995). 
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a); Clarke, supra note 158, at 59. 
160 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B). 
161 See Clarke, supra note 158, at 64. 
162 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1998); Clarke, supra note 158, at 64. 
163 See Clarke, supra note 158, at 64. 
164 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.420; Clarke, supra note 158, at 64. 
165 See 60 Fed. Reg. 8212, 8214 (1995); Clarke, supra note 158, at 64. 
166 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 8214; Clarke, supra note 158, at 65. 
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into the environment.167 The HRS requires extensive information 
about the facility, its surroundings, the hazardous substances at the 
site, and the geological character of the surrounding area-all of 
which are evaluated for each site by the assignment of numerical 
values.16s The final score is calculated in accordance with a formula 
that assigns weights to all numerical values and then totals all the 
relevant figures. 169 HRS scores range from zero to 100, and sites that 
score 28.5 or greater are eligible for listing on the NPL.170 
EPA may then place an individual site on the NPL by promulgating 
a regulation pursuant to standard notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures. 171 After EPA proposes the site for inclusion on the NPL, 
interested parties usually have sixty days to file comments or objec-
tions to the proposed listing.172 When EPA publishes the Final Notice 
of Listing, its decision can be challenged by filing a petition for judicial 
review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, which has exclusive jurisdiction over any regulations prom-
ulgated under CERCLA.173 The applicable standard of review defined 
in the Administrative Procedure Act allows the judiciary to set aside 
or compel agency action where the agency decision is "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law."174 This standard affords great deference to EPA's technical 
determinations. 175 
Once EPA names a site to the NPL, the remediation process be-
gins.176 "The remediation process consists of several phases: a Reme-
dial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIIFS) that defines the ex-
tent of contamination and explores remediation alternatives; a Record 
of Decision (ROD) that selects and describes the remediation alterna-
tive selected; and the Remedial Design/Remedial Action, which in-
167 See Henrichs, supra note 148, at 729-30. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1998); Henrichs, supra note 148, at 730. A site may also be designated 
to the NPL by each state or territory's ability to designate one priority site, regardless of its 
HRS score and by EPA's ability to make an emergency designation if certain criteria are met. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(2), (3). 
171 See Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 1516, 1518 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
Clarke, supra note 158, at 65. 
172 See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994); Clarke, supra note 158, at 65. 
173 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1994); Henrichs, supra note 148, at 747. 
174 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Henrichs, supra note 148, at 748. 
175 See Henrichs, supra note 148, at 748. 
176 See Clarke, supra note 158, at 63. 
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volves actual performance of the remediation plan."l77 At this point, 
EPA can do the work itself using money from the Superfund which 
will be reimbursed by the PRPs (if they are available), order the 
PRPs to do the work by issuing an administrative order, or petition 
for court-ordered injunctive relief. l78 
When courts or EPA require PRPs to reimburse the Superfund, 
they may also be liable for punitive damages of up to three times the 
cost of remediation. l79 EPA may also require the payment of natural 
resource damages for "injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, 
destruction, or loss resulting from" a release of a hazardous sub-
stance. lSO Because neither of these remedies is available under RCRA, 
pursuing a claim under CERCLA is often much more attractive to 
EPA. 
Although the initial driving forces behind the proposed Superfund 
listing for the GE/Housatonic River Site were the 1996 senatorial 
contest between John F. Kerry and William F. Weld and the discovery 
of PCBs on residential property in the Pittsfield area, federal regula-
tors were quick to abandon the RCRA consent permits in support of 
the Superfund listing.l8I The listing was attractive to EPA because it 
would have allowed the Agency to control the implementation of the 
entire remediation plan and recover up to three times the cost of 
cleanup from GE.l82 Moreover, a Superfund listing would authorize 
EPA to recover damages for injury to natural resources, whereas 
RCRA does not provide for such a recovery.l83 Federal regulators 
viewed the recovery of these "natural resource damages" as an im-
portant precedent to set as they would be dealing with GE, and 
similar corporations, on other contaminated sites in the future. 184 
When EPA proposed the Superfund listing in September 1997, GE's 
main reason for opposing it was because of the extremely high price 
it would have to pay for the cleanup, especially in light of CERCLA's 
inclusion of the natural resources damages and the triple damages 
177 [d.; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.430(a)(2), (1)(4)-(6), 300.435 (1998); Cmden, supra note 145, at 524. 
178 See Cmden, supra note 145, at 524-25. 
179 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3); Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 367. 
180 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). 
181 See Weld Turns Up the Heat, supra note 13, at B10; Tynan, supra note 11, at A27. 
182 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607(a), (c)(3). 
1&'1 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) with generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987. 
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(c); Theo Stein, PCB Deal Establishes Precedent, BERKSHIRE 
EAGLE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter PCB Deal]; Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 
1. 
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provisions. l85 GE was also very much opposed to EPA's plan to dredge 
out the PCB-sediment in a two-mile stretch of the Housatonic River.186 
GE claimed that scientific soundness of dredging had not yet been 
proven and that it may even do more harm than good to the river.187 
Obviously, GE wanted to avoid paying about $40 million for a remedy 
that may not prove to be beneficial,I88 Aside from GE's own aversion 
to the CERCLA regime, there are a number of valid criticisms sur-
rounding the way the regime is implemented. 
III. CRITICISMS OF CERCLA 
Although state and federal regulators were initially quick to em-
brace the idea of a Superfund listing, the deficiencies of the CERCLA 
regime became obvious. The two most basic criticisms of the Super-
fund scheme are the length of time it takes to remediate a hazardous 
waste site and the resulting high cost of remediation.189 Furthermore, 
the extremely broad liability and the very stringent, yet uncertain, 
clean-up criteria CERCLA imposes serve as formidable barriers to 
the redevelopment of the contaminated site.190 
A. Remediation Takes Too Long Under CERCLA 
As of September 25, 1997, there were 1204 sites on the NPL and 
another fifty-two proposed sites awaiting final agency action.191 Since 
CERCLA's passage in 1980, only 135 sites have been completely 
cleaned up and deleted from the NPL.192 Unfortunately, it could be 
more than a decade before cleanup is completed at the sites presently 
on the NPL.193 
185 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C), (c)(3); Carley, supra note 1, at AI; Cohen, supra note 3, at 
B2. 
186 See Cohen, supra note 3, at B2. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. GE spokesperson, David Warshaw, stated that EPA was demanding "an ecologically 
devastating two-mile dredging project, before evaluation and balancing any adverse impacts of 
the dredging, and that is unprecedented and violates the EPA's own policy and regulations." [d. 
189 See Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It's Time for Repeal After a Decade of Failure, 12 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 165, 166 (1993). 
190 See id. at 173-75; Sarah W. Rubenstein, Comment, CERCLA's Contribution to the Federal 
Brownfields Problem: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149, 
161-62 (1997); Julie A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers 
to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285, 292-93 (1995). 
191 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,450, 50,453 (1997). 
192 See id. 
193 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: TIMES TO COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT 
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In March 1997, the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that 
the "EPA took an average of 9.4 years-calculated from the date of 
each site's discovery-to evaluate and process the nonfederal sites it 
added to the National Priorities List in 1996."194 Once placed on the 
NPL, clean-up completions took an average of 10.6 years.195 This 
means that a hazardous waste site, once identified, could languish in 
the Superfund system for close to twenty years before cleanup is 
completed.196 
EPA says the increase in the time taken to list sites on the NPL 
has occurred because of the large number of sites initially referred to 
the agency for evaluation and EPA's emphasis on completing work on 
already listed sites.197 EPA attributes "the increases in time taken to 
complete cleanups to the growing complexity of the cleanup problems 
at the sites, the agency's efforts to reach settlements with the parties 
responsible for the contamination at sites, and resource con-
straints."198 
B. Remediation Is Too Expensive Under CERCLA 
As of 1995, the average clean-up cost at a NPL site was over $30 
million.199 These costs are much higher for projects of the complexity 
and magnitUde of the GE/Housatonic River Site, which is the largest 
contaminated industrial site in New England and has an estimated 
clean-up cost of more than $250 million.20o The most pressing concern 
surrounding these high costs is that a sizable portion of the Superfund 
budget is wasted on repetitive feasibility studies, administrative 
costs, and litigation, rather than used for actual cleanup.201 
All parties involved in a Superfund site are concerned that a large 
portion of the clean-up cost is allocated to transactional costs instead 
of actual site remediation.202 Estimates of Superfund transaction costs 
AND CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 2 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE REPORT]. 
194 Id. at 1. 
195 See id. at 2. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 193, at 2. 
199 See ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW 14 (Richard L. Revesz & 
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) [hereinafter ANALYZING SUPERFUND]. 
200 See Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1. 
201 See McGee, supra note 189, at 170 (about 75% of Superfund's budget is spent on repetitive 
studies and litigation rather than cleanups). 
202 See Frank Cross & Scott Segal, And the Meek Shall Inherit Cleaner Earth, 9 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 269, 270 (1993-94); John, supra note 99, at 970-71. 
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have ranged from twenty-one to forty-four percent of total project 
expenditures.203 A Rand Corporation study concluded that transaction 
costs accounted for thirty-two percent of private-sector PRP expen-
ditures and eighty-eight percent of insurer expenditures on insurance 
claims related to hazardous waste cleanups through 1991.204 Further-
more, "the private sector incurred $11.3 billion in NPL-related expen-
ditures through 1991, of which 36% were transactional in nature."205 
The Rand Corporation's research on Superfund transaction costs 
attributes those high costs to a "litigious atmosphere" and an "adver-
sarial relationship" between government and PRPS.206 The situation 
is largely a result of "joint and several liability [which] sets up a 
tension between the EPA and the parties, as well as among the 
parties themselves, at a time when the EPA might also prefer to have 
cooperation and expeditious handling of a site."207 
Some commentators have further asserted that a portion of the 
extensive clean-up costs is likely due to poor control or oversight.208 
When EPA remediates a site itself using Superfund monies and seeks 
reimbursement from the PRPs, it hires contractors to perform the 
investigative and remedial work.209 These commentators argue that 
often the same contractor is hired for both types of work, which 
creates an incentive for the contractor to inflate the projected clean-
up costS.21O In addition, EPA does not always closely monitor expenses 
to prevent frivolous expenditures and the padding of expense ac-
counts by contractors.211 
C. CERCLA's Strict, Joint And Several Liability Scheme Impedes 
Redevelopment 
CERCLA holds four groups of PRPs liable for clean-up costs: (1) 
present owners and operators; (2) past owners and operators; (3) 
generators of hazardous waste who arrange for transportation, dis-
posal, or treatment; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste.212 Under 
203 See Cross & Segal, supra note 202, at 272. 
204 See ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 199, at 183. 
205Id. 
206 See Cross & Segal, supra note 202, at 272. 
207Id. 
208 See Karen L. Demeo, Note, Is CERCLA Working? An Analysis of the Settlement and 
Contribution Provisions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493, 523 (1994); John, supra note 99, at 971-72. 
209 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 523. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. at 523-24; John, supra note 99, at 971-72. 
212 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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CERCLA's strict, joint and several liability scheme, any or all of these 
parties can be held responsible for the entire cost of cleanup regard-
less of faultP3 This scheme has been criticized for greatly impeding 
the redevelopment of the contaminated sites because it allows a sub-
sequent purchaser of contaminated property to be held liable for the 
full cost of cleanup even if that purchaser was not responsible for the 
contamination.214 
Congress attempted to deal with this criticism by passing the In-
nocent Landowner Defense to Liability as part of the SARA amend-
ments in 1986.215 However, this defense only applies to owners who 
"unknowingly acquired contaminated property ... and who under-
took all appropriate inquiry at the time of acquisition."216 Accordingly, 
the Innocent Landowner Defense would not shield a buyer or devel-
oper purchasing property that has already been proposed or named 
to the NPL or is known to be contaminated.217 
Recognizing the limited applicability of this defense, EPA issued a 
guidance in 1989 to help relieve purchasers of contaminated waste 
sites of liability.218 This guidance allows prospective purchasers of 
contaminated property to enter into agreements with EPA, whereby 
the purchaser will undertake clean-up actions or contribute to clean-
up costs in exchange for EPA issuing a covenant not to sue.219 Al-
though EPA hoped the guidance would encourage the reuse and 
redevelopment of contaminated sites, only a handful of these agree-
ments have been formed.220 This has been attributed to EPA's reluc-
tance to allow a site to escape liability, thereby demanding greater 
clean-up efforts or cost contributions than prospective purchasers are 
willing to make.221 
CERCLA creates yet another disincentive to the reuse and rede-
velopment of contaminated property through its treatment of secured 
creditors.222 Although courts have been inconsistent concerning the 
213 See id. § 9601(32). 
214 See United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Anne Slaughter 
Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of Superfund Liability, 10 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 27, 28 (1996); Solo, supra note 190, at 293-95. 
215 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). 
216 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 155, at 12-104-05. 
217 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 28. 
218 See 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241-42 (1989). 
219 See id. 
220 See Berger et aI., supra note 143, at 87; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 155. 
221 See Berger et aI., supra note 143, at 87; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 155. 
222 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(20)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (secured creditor exemption). 
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level of participation in the management of the property that is re-
quired for imposing liability upon the lender, it is clear that lenders 
can become entwined in the CERCLA liability scheme, simply as a 
result of financing the purchase of contaminated property.223 Because 
of this uncertainty of potential liability, lenders are discouraged from 
lending money to developers of previously or potentially contami-
nated sites.224 
D. CERCLA's Vague, Yet Stringent, Clean-up Standards Impede 
Redevelopment 
Commentators have criticized CERCLA for further discouraging 
reuse and redevelopment of contaminated sites by leaving a great 
deal of uncertainty as to the standards to be applied in remedial 
actions.225 The mechanisms by which CERCLA authorizes EPA to 
regulate contaminated sites are discretionary in nature and do not 
enumerate specific standards for remediation.226 CERCLA requires a 
site to be cleaned to a degree that assures protection of human health 
and the environment, which is usually interpreted stringently to re-
quire a permanent remedy.227 
Because CERCLA contemplates a permanent remedy, its remedial 
standards cannot be varied with the proposed use of the property.228 
As a result, many commentators argue that cleanups are often over-
done so that property that will always be used for industrial purposes 
223 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
a secured creditor may incur CERCLA liability, without instituting foreclosure proceedings or 
being involved in the day-to-day operations of the facility, by participating in the financial 
management of the facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's 
treatment of hazardous wastes); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 
563 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that lender purchasing mortgaged property at foreclosure sale was 
not eligible for protection under § 9601(20) of CERCLA); United States v. Maryland Bank & 
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that lender who purchased mortgaged 
property at foreclosure sale could not qualify for secured creditor exemption); United States v. 
Mirabile, [1995]15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (prompt 
sale of foreclosure property barred application of CERCLA liability to lender); Rubenstein, 
supra note 190, at 156-57 (citing Waterville Indus. v. Finance Auth. of Me., 984 F.2d 549, 553 
(1st Cir. 1993) ("[A] maturation of ownership does not divest the owner of protection under 
CERCLA's security interest exception so long as the owner proceeds within a reasonable time 
to divest itself of ownership."). 
224 See Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 157-58. 
225 See id. at 161. 
226 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606. 
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d); John, supra note 99, at 975. 
228 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 520-21; John, supra note 99, at 975. 
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is cleaned to a level that will make the property safe for a park or 
playground.229 This needlessly increases the cost and the amount of 
time a cleanup will take, further stalling redevelopment of the site.230 
With an abandoned site, if potential purchasers are uncertain as to 
the degree of cleanliness a contaminated site will be expected to 
achieve, they will be unable to estimate the required remediation 
costs, and in turn, the value of the property.231 Accordingly, these sites 
will remain vacant and unused as the uncertainty of potential costs 
discourage purchasers from redeveloping the sites.232 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO CERCLA 
A. RCRA 
Probably the most obvious alternative to implementing cleanup 
under CERCLA is to proceed under RCRA. As cleanup has become 
more and more cumbersome under CERCLA, EPA has begun to look 
toward RCRA as a more efficient and cost-effective method for deal-
ing with contaminated sites.233 
The corrective action process under RCRA parallels the process 
established for CERCLA remedial actions.234 Both processes under-
take preliminary assessments and site investigations, selection of 
remedies needed to protect human health and the environment, re-
medial design and implementation of remedial action, and operation 
and maintenance to ensure continued effectiveness of the remedy.235 
The fundamental difference between the two schemes is that under 
RCRA, the party responsible for the contamination implements the 
cleanup, while under CERCLA EPA usually implements the cleanup, 
with the costs paid by the responsible party.236 
The obvious advantage of a cleanup implemented by the responsi-
ble party under RCRA is that the party has an incentive to keep the 
costs to a minimum.237 Since the responsible party is implementing the 
cleanup, it has the flexibility to decide who will conduct the cleanup 
229 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 520-21; John, supra note 99, at 975. 
230 See John, supra note 99, at 973, 975; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 161-62. 
231 See Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 161. 
232 See id. at 162. 
233 See John, supra note 99, at 951-52. 
234 See Curry et al., supra note 95, at 376. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 524; John, supra note 99, at 973. 
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and how it will proceed.238 This will avoid the waste commonly asso-
ciated with CERCLA cleanups that are implemented by EPA con-
tractors who have no incentive to keep the costs down since EPA will 
recover the costs from the responsible party.239 
Similarly, the responsible party has a monetary incentive to ensure 
that contractors implement the cleanup as quickly as possible to avoid 
paying these contractors any longer than necessary.240 In addition, 
RCRA provides for the assessment of civil penalties for failure to 
obey RCRA regulations, thereby increasing the incentive to conduct 
timely cleanups.241 
Furthermore, the RCRA scheme itself, which allows the parties to 
come together and determine the solutions that best correspond to 
the problems presented, permits the cleanup to proceed in a quicker 
and more efficient manner.242 This ability to negotiate appropriate 
remedies will likely avoid the ten to twenty year black hole of CER-
CLA site identification, assessment, and hopefully in the end, reme-
diation.243 
In permitting EPA and the responsible party to negotiate the re-
mediation plan to best correspond to the problems presented, RCRA 
avoids the inflexibility caused by CERCLA's strict, but uncertain, 
clean-up standards.244 Because CERCLA contemplates permanent 
remedies, cleanups are often overdone on land that will always be put 
to industrial uses.245 RCRA's more flexible clean-up standards allow 
remedial actions to proceed more quickly and inexpensively.246 
Because RCRA is a federal scheme, it protects the responsible 
party by providing a federally-established cleanup completion, thus 
preventing any future federal liability.247 As a result, remediation 
under RCRA allows greater flexibility in remedial actions without the 
corresponding problem of the possibility of future federal liability that 
accompanies remedies under a state brownfields scheme or a state 
voluntary clean-up program, as discussed below.24S 
238 See John, supra note 99, at 973. 
239 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 523-24. 
240 See id.; John, supra note 99, at 971-72, 975-76. 
241 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (1994). 
242 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 520-21; John, supra note 99, at 972-73. 
243 See John, supra note 99, at 972-73, 975; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra 
note 193, at 2. 
244 See John, supra note 99, at 975; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 161-62. 
245 See John, supra note 99, at 975. 
246 See id. at 973, 975; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 161-62. 
247 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 94-95; Buzbee, supra note 92, at 47. 
248 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 94-95; Buzbee, supra note 92, at 47. 
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B. State Browrifields Legislation 
A second possible alternative to implementing a remediation plan 
under CERCLA would be to place the contaminated site within the 
workings of a brownfields legislative scheme. "Brownfield" is the term 
used to describe an abandoned or underutilized industrial or commer-
cial site, likely to be located in an urban area.249 Currently, many states 
are implementing or exploring the possibility of brownfields legisla-
tion to deal specifically with the cleanup and productive reuse of 
contaminated industrial sites.250 
Many commentators place the blame for the brownfields phenom-
ena on CERCLA's strict liability scheme, which imposes liability on 
past or present owners or operators of contaminated property, re-
gardless of their responsibility for the contamination.251 Fearing the 
potential indeterminate liability of the CERCLA scheme, owners 
abandon contaminated property and potential purchasers, who would 
be willing to cleanup the property in exchange for a very low purchase 
price, shy away.252 Accordingly, millions of acres of contaminated in-
dustrial property lie vacant in urban areas where the appropriate 
industrial infrastructure already exists.253 Instead, business and cor-
porations develop their industrial and commercial facilities on open 
space in suburban and rural areas, thereby avoiding any liability that 
may accompany a previously used site.254 
Recognizing that CERCLA has not been effective in remediating 
sites quickly and that productive reuse of a contaminated site will only 
be accomplished by allowing a business or corporation to purchase the 
property cheaply and then pay for the cleanup, many states have 
enacted brownfields legislation.255 As opposed to letting a site languish 
within the federal CERCLA scheme and lose out on the potential tax 
base, job creation, and prosperity that the redeveloped site could 
249 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 27. 
250 See id. at 28--29; Berger et al., supra note 143, at 89-93 (discussing New York State's 
Environmental Conservation Law); Leslie Goff-Sanders, Brownfields Legislation: A Viable 
Option for the Southeast, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 141, 142 (1997) (discussing 
Florida, Georgia and Kentucky's brownfields statutes). 
251 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 27; Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of 
Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 265, 272-73 (1997). 
252 See Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 149-50. 
253 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 27; Berger et al., supra note 143, at 73. 
254 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 73; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 149--50. 
255 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 28-29 (discussing responses by Midwestern states); Berger 
et al., supra note 143, at 93; Goff-Sanders, supra note 250, at 153-65 (discussing responses by 
Florida, Georgia and Kentucky). 
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provide, these states have decided that contaminated sites can be 
remediated and redeveloped much more quickly and efficiently under 
the control of a state scheme.256 The pieces of legislation vary from 
state to state, but usually include provisions that require "state-ap-
proved standardized cleanup levels or methods by which such cleanup 
levels are derived; reduced government oversight of the cleanup proc-
ess; state issuance of a certificate of completion for the cleanup; and 
state issuance of a covenant not to sue with regard to any contamina-
tion remaining at the site."257 Many states also include provisions that 
offer tax credits and other financial incentives for remediation and 
redevelopment and that protect future "innocent landowners" and 
lenders.258 
Again, it is important to remember that while a cleanup imple-
mented under a state brownfields statute will absolve a party of 
liability under state law, it will not absolve the party of potential 
liability under the federal CERCLA scheme.259 As such, even if a 
cleanup is implemented under a brownfields statute, a party may 
subsequently be liable under CERCLA if EPA believes that the 
cleanup is not in accordance with the NCP or if additional contamina-
tion is later found on the site qualifying the site for listing on the 
NPL.260 
Despite the reluctance of EPA to get involved in the implementa-
tion of individual state brownfield programs, it has acknowledged 
that, to promote cleanups under state programs, it must address 
impediments that. may exist as the result of federal environmental 
laws.261 For example, Region V, which was one of the first EPA re-
gional offices to organize a Brownfields Task Force, included language 
in the Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Minnesota 
and Illinois (two states with brownfields legislation in place) providing 
that sites remediated successfully under state authority will not re-
ceive further attention from EPA Region V.262 These MOAs intend to 
encourage redevelopment by allowing prospective purchasers to bet-
ter determine their federal liability for cleanup of a site.263 However, 
the MOAs do not rise to the level of an actual covenant not to sue, 
256 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 72-73. 
257 Andrew, supra note 214, at 28. 
258 See id. at 29. 
259 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 95. 
260 See id. 
26) See Andrew, supra note 214, at 30. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
• 
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CERCLA case where EPA must remediate an abandoned site and 
then locate the former owners or operators for recovery, nor is it the 
case where many parties are responsible and EPA needs to use CER-
CLA's strict, joint and several liability to effect recovery.280 
Proponents of CERCLA argued that since EPA had already iden-
tified the PRP and the listing process had already begun for the 
Pittsfield site, it would not take the estimated 9.4 years to add the 
site to the NPL.281 However, since GE could challenge EPA's final 
decision to list the Pittsfield site on the NPL, it would still be a 
number of years, though not likely nine, before the site would officially 
be named to the NPL.282 Furthermore, in light of the possibility of 
paying triple damages on a cleanup that had already been estimated 
between $250 and $500 million, GE would have had an enormous 
incentive to use every resource to fight the Superfund listing.283 
The "litigious atmosphere" that CERCLA creates would have 
placed GE and EPA in an "adversarial relationship" that would have 
further stalled the clean-up process.284 Mter complying with all 
RCRA requirements and deadlines over the last four years and 
spending over $100 million, GE felt spurned by EPA and saw no 
reason to cooperate with the proposed Superfund listing.285 This situ-
ation would have only served to hurt the residents of Pittsfield, as GE 
would no longer have the looming possibility of a Superfund listing as 
an incentive to cooperate and would instead fight every step in the 
CERCLA process tooth and nail,286 
Although the listing process would be stalled through litigation, in 
theory the clean-up process under CERCLA should proceed more 
quickly than that under RCRA.287 Because CERCLA only allows 
courts to review EPA's remedial decisions when EPA initiates an 
action to force parties to perform a remedy or to recover costs in-
280 See id. §§ 9606, 9607, 9612, 9613; Cruden, supra note 145, at 520. Since the Superfund is 
insufficient to finance cleanups at all sites, it must be allocated to those sites where there are 
no viable PRPs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606,9607,9612,9613; Cruden, supra note 145, at 520. 
281 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 193, at 1. 
282 See 42 U.S.C § 9613(a). 
283 See id. § 9607(c)(3); Cohen, supra note 3, at B2; Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, 
at 1; PCB Deal, supra note 184, at 1; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
284 See Cross & Segal, supra note 202, at 272. 
285 See Angelo, supra note 8, at 44; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
286 See Carley, supra note 1, at AI; Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1; PCB Deal, 
supra note 184, at 1. 
287 See Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 386. 
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curred, GE will not be able to appeal every remedial decision made, 
as it was allowed to under RCRA.288 
Unfortunately, this rationale did not apply in the GE case because 
the RCRA corrective action permit was already in place before the 
Superfund listing was proposed.289 As such, the appeal process under 
RCRA had been completed and remediation under the order had 
already begun.29o Although an initial Superfund listing may have ef-
fected cleanup more quickly than proceeding under RCRA, at the 
time the Superfund listing was proposed, it would have likely taken 
longer to complete the cleanup of the site under CERCLA because of 
the incitement of a new round of litigation.291 
The fact that weighed in favor of CERCLA cleanup was that many 
of the site assessments and investigations conducted under the 
RCRA scheme could be used in implementing cleanup under CER-
CLA, since the corrective action process under RCRA parallels the 
remedial action process under CERCLA.292 This fact may have re-
duced the amount of time a CERCLA cleanup would have taken be-
cause many of the needed assessments of the GE site had already 
been performed under RCRA.293 Even still, the average cleanup com-
pletion under CERCLA takes 10.6 years, and it is unlikely that 
cleanup ofa contaminated site of the magnitude of the GE/Housatonic 
River Site would be completed in any less time.294 
Although a good portion of the site assessments had already taken 
place and some of the litigation costs under CERCLA would have 
been avoided because there is only one PRP, a CERCLA cleanup in 
Pittsfield would still likely be more expensive than a RCRA cleanup.295 
As previously discussed, because GE was implementing the cleanup 
under RCRA, it had the incentive to keep costs to a minimum.296 
Accordingly, GE closely planned and monitored the cleanup to ensure 
288 See 42 U.S.C §§ 6976(b), 9613(g); Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 386; John, supra note 99, 
at 972-73. 
289 See 62 Fed. Reg. 50,450, 50,454 (1997); PERMIT, supra note 126. 
290 See PERMIT, supra note 126; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
291 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 193, at 1; Cohen, supra note 3, 
at B2; Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1; PCB Deal, supra note 184, at 1; GE in 
Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
292 See Curry et aI., supra note 95, at 376-77. 
293 See GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. See generally PERMIT, supra note 126. 
294 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 193, at 2. 
295 See Cross & Segal, supra note 202, at 271-72, 275; John, supra note 99, at 973. 
296 See John, supra note 99, at 973. 
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that the monetary waste inherent in a cleanup conducted by EPA 
contractors did not occur.297 
Moreover, RCRA allows EPA and the PRP to negotiate the form 
of remediation that best corresponds to the problems presented and 
the projected future use of the property.298 This permits the clean-up 
standards under RCRA to be less stringent than those statutorily 
mandated under CERCLA.299 Under RCRA, GE could remediate the 
site to a level that coincided with its likely future industrial use, as 
opposed to a CERCLA level of cleanup that would be consistent with 
use as a park or school.300 Because it was being implemented by GE 
and was being performed to a level consistent with future use, a 
RCRA cleanup would have likely been less expensive than a cleanup 
performed under CERCLA.301 
In terms of encouraging the reuse and redevelopment of the GE 
site, RCRA seemed to provide the more attractive option. Because 
actual remediation was already in progress, completion of the GE site 
cleanup under RCRA probably would have occurred much sooner 
than restarting the process under CERCLA.302 Furthermore, reme-
diating the property to the level consistent with its future use, rather 
than a level designed to render it suitable for any purpose, would have 
further expedited the cleanup.303 Together, these two factors likely 
would have ensured that the site would be available for redevelop-
ment much sooner under RCRA than under CERCLA.304 
While proceeding under RCRA, GE and the city of Pittsfield had 
agreed on broad redevelopment plans for the site, including plans to 
make portions of the site available as soon as they were remediated.305 
When the site was threatened by a Superfund listing, GE had taken 
these redevelopment plans off the table.306 Although this may have 
been seen as GE playing politics, EPA should have anticipated this 
result when proposing CERCLA.307 
297 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 523-24. 
298 See John, supra note 99, at 975. 
299 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9605(a) (1994) (outlining CERCLA cleanup standards); John, supra note 99, at 975. 
300 See John, supra note 99, at 975. 
301 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 523-24; John, supra note 99, at 975. 
302 See Angelo, supra note 8, at 44; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
303 See Demeo, supra note 208, at 520-21; John, supra note 99, at 975. 
304 See John, supra note 99, at 975. 
305 See Cohen, supra note 3, at H2; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
306 See Cross & Segal, supra note 202, at 272; Cohen, supra note 3, at H2. 
307 See Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1; Theo Stein, New Life/or GE Plant: New 
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Redevelopment would have been further impeded by the mere 
Superfund designation itself.30B Because the CERCLA scheme allows 
a subsequent purchaser of contaminated property to be held liable for 
the full cost of cleanup even if that purchaser was not responsible for 
the contamination, many potential purchasers of the GE site would 
be reluctant to possibly entangle themselves in the CERCLA liability 
web.309 Assurances by EPA that an innocent purchaser would only be 
subject to liability ifit further contaminated the property or disturbed 
previously remediated areas releasing contamination would not be 
enough to overcome the stigma associated with the broad liability 
scheme and enormity of cleanups under CERCLA.31O 
B. Brownfields Remediation for Pittsfield? 
At the time EPA proposed the Superfund listing, placing the 
GE/Housatonic River Site within a brownfield legislative scheme was 
not a viable option because Massachusetts did not yet have a brown-
fields statute.3ll During this time, however, a brownfields bill was 
moving through the state legislature at the behest of Representative 
Peter Larkin (D-Pittsfield).312 Larkin recognized the need for this type 
of legislation to encourage economic redevelopment of contaminated 
sites in depressed industrial cities such as Pittsfield, Fall River, and 
Worcester.313 Finally, the governor signed the brownfields bill into law 
on August 5, 1998.314 
If the Massachusetts brownfields legislation had initially been avail-
able as a remediation option, GE would have been unwilling to con-
England's Largest Brownfields Project, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 10 [hereinafter 
New Life]; GE in Pittsfield, supra note 4. 
308 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 28; Solo, supra note 190, at 293-95. 
309 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Andrew, supra note 214, at 28; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 
153; Solo, supra note 190, at 293-95. 
3\0 See Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 153-55; Solo, supra note 190, at 295; Breakthrough on 
PCBs, supra note 128, at 1; A Chronology of the PCB Negotiations, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Oct. 
26, 1998, at 8. 
311 See Tina Cassidy, Vote Seen on 'Brown fields , Pollution Bill Measure Would Encourage 
Reclaiming of Tainted Sites, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 1998, at Fl. 
312 See id.; Larkin's Bill Set the Stage, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 10 [hereinafter 
Larkin's Bill]. 
313 See Cassidy, supra note 311, at F1; Larkin's Bill, supra note 312, at 10. 
314 See Peter J. Howe, Brownfields Bill Signed, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1998, at B5 [herein-
after Brownfields Bill]. The bill that Ultimately passed was sponsored by the House Committee 
and was a composite of the various brownfields bills that had been circulating in the Massachu-
setts House of Representatives. See id.; Larkin's Bill, supra note 312, at 10. Although Larkin 
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duct a cleanup under this piece of state legislation because of the 
potential of continuing federalliability.3l5 Until there is coordination 
between state and federal authorities regarding brownfields, a PRP 
at a contaminated site the size of the GE/Housatonic River Site would 
be hard pressed to conduct a cleanup solely under a state statute.3l6 
The passage of the brownfields legislation did, however, ensure that 
a redevelopment package could be included in the settlement between 
GE and EPA.317 
C. Voluntary Clean-up Program for Pittsfield? 
As of yet, Massachusetts has not explored the potential for a vol-
untary clean-up program and the federal government has declined to 
implement a federal CAP.3ls Even if Massachusetts did have its own 
state-implemented voluntary clean-up program, GE would be ill-ad-
vised to proceed under it because of the possibility of future liability 
under CERCLA.319 Until there is cooperation between the state and 
federal governments to allow a responsible party to take part in a 
state voluntary clean-up program without the possibility of future 
federal liability, it is unlikely that a state voluntary clean-up program 
will ever be a viable alternative for more extensively contaminated 
sites like the GE/Housatonic River Site in Pittsfield.320 
VI. THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 
On September 24,1998, EPA and GE entered into a precedent-set-
ting negotiated settlement.32l The settlement agreement directs GE 
and EPA to begin the cleanup immediately and specifies a timetable 
for each portion of the clean-up project.322 The timetable orders that 
GE complete cleanup of the plant site as soon as possible to begin the 
is not listed as the author of the brownfields bill that became law, he is often credited as the 
driving force behind such legislation. See Brownfields Bill, supra note 314, at B5; Larkin's Bill, 
supra note 312, at 10. 
315 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 95. 
316 See id. 
317 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 8; Larkin's Bill, supra note 291, 
at 10. 
318 See Buzbee, supra note 92, at 38. 
319 See id. 
320 See Berger et al., supra note 143, at 95. 
321 See Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, supra note 29. 
322 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6, 7,8; PCB Deal, supra note 
184, at 1. 
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redevelopment, that cleanup of the first one-half mile of the Housa-
tonic River be completed in one to two years, and that cleanup of the 
next one and one-half miles of the river begin after the completion of 
the first one-half mile and be completed in two to three years.323 
The settlement agreement specifies that the clean-up standards for 
the GE Plant Site are based on the assumption that there is no cur-
rent or reasonably foreseeable future use of groundwater for drinking 
water and that surface soils will be remediated to allow unrestricted 
commercial/industrial use.324 This requires remediation of surface soils 
(zero to one foot) for PCB levels greater than twenty-five ppm on 
average and of deeper soils (one to six feet) if PCB levels are greater 
than 200 ppm on average.325 For property used for recreational pur-
poses, such as the Housatonic River Floodplain, the former oxbows 
areas, and the banks of Silver Lake, GE must remediate the soil to 
achieve average PCB levels often ppm in the top foot and fifteen ppm 
in the one to three foot interva1.326 For residential properties along 
the Housatonic River, GE must remediate soil to achieve average 
PCB levels of two ppm.327 GE will remove and restore the Housatonic 
River soil to achieve average PCB levels of ten ppm in the top foot 
and fifteen ppm at one to three feet.328 
The settlement agreement stipulates that during the remediation 
process, there will be a formalized dispute resolution process.329 The 
settlement also provides for agreements between the government 
agencies and GE not to sue each other so long as GE is performing 
the work adequately, and protects GE from contribution claims.330 
The settlement agreement also includes a Brownfields Redevelop-
ment and Economic Aid package.33l This provision mandates that GE 
clean up its plant site consistent with the agreed upon standards, de-
molish some of the buildings, refurbish other buildings, landscape the 
plant grounds, and transfer portions of the property to the PEDA.332 
323 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6, 7, 8. 
324 See id. at 2. 
325 See id. at 3. 
326 See id. at 4-5. 
327 See id. at 5. This refers only to those residential properties on the Housatonic River 
Floodplain. See id. Those residential properties which were contaminated by yard fill are not 
part of the settlement agreement as they will continue to be remediated on an expedited track 
and will remain a high priority. See id. at 1. 
328 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6. 
329 See id. at 10. 
330 See id. 
331 See id. at 8. 
332 See id. 
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PEDA will be a legally distinct entity from both the city of Pittsfield 
and the state, and will take ownership of portions of the plant site and 
market them to new tenants.aaa PEDA will then lease, and eventually 
sell, these portions of the redeveloped plant site to developers or 
tenants.334 Pittsfield officials have stated that they have already re-
ceived a number of inquiries from interested companies.a35 
The preceding provisions comprise the substance of the settlement 
agreement.aa6 This agreement is considered precedent-setting be-
cause settlement is not usually considered for the remediation of sites 
of this magnitude in a sea of federal statutory regimes.337 Notwith-
standing, pursuing a settlement seems to make the most sense since 
it incorporates the best attributes of the various alternatives dis-
cussed above, while avoiding many of the problems associated with 
them.338 
First and. foremost, it avoids the extensive time lapses associated 
with proceeding under both CERCLA and RCRA.339 The agreement 
directed GE and EPA to begin the cleanup immediately, and within 
days of its announcement GE contractors had started a source control 
project to prevent any more PCBs from flowing into the Housatonic 
River.34o Furthermore, the remediation timetables set out in the 
agreement dictate that GE will complete the bulk of the cleanup of 
the plant site and the Housatonic River in three to five years.341 
Although these timetables are ambitious, GE has an incentive to 
adhere to them because a swift cleanup will keep costs to a mini-
mum.342 Since GE will be implementing most of the cleanup itself, GE 
can keep costs low by closely monitoring the clean-up process and by 
proceeding as quickly as possible.343 This incentive to move fast at a 
low cost would be lost under the CERCLA scheme because EPA 
would probably conduct a good portion of the cleanup and possibly 
333 See Nw Life, supra note 307, at 10. 
334 See Greg Sukiennik, City's Development Authority Prepares to Oversee GE Site, BERK-
SHIRE EAGLE, Nov. 11, 1998, at 15. 
335 See Nw Life, supra note 307, at 15. 
336 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29. 
337 See Allen & Howe, supra note 29, at AI; Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1. 
338 See id. 
339 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 193, at 2; Allen & Howe, supra 
note 29, at AI; PCB Deal, supra note 184, at 1. 
340 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 3; PCB Deal, supra note 184, at 
1. 
341 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6-8. 
342 See John, supra note 99, at 975. 
343 See id. at 973, 975. 
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bill GE for up to three times the cost.344 To illustrate, EPA has stated 
that the site will cost more than $250 million to remediate, while GE 
has proposed ambitiously that it could do the work for $150 million.345 
By retaining one of the positive attributes of the RCRA scheme, 
allowing the PRP to conduct most of the cleanup itself, the settlement 
will avoid the staggering clean-up costs and a ten to twenty year lag 
between identification, assessment, and remediation that occurs un-
der the CERCLA scheme.346 
The settlement further avoids high costs and extensive delays by 
eliminating the legal wrangling that occurs under both RCRA and 
CERCLA. By providing for a formalized dispute resolution process 
and covenants not to sue, the agreement removes some of the legal 
options that many feel GE used to stall the RCRA process.347 As such, 
the settlement agreement has managed to maintain the RCRA incen-
tive for GE to proceed quickly, while eliminating some of the legal 
stalling tactics that many felt made the RCRA process ineffective at 
the GE/Housatonic River Site.348 
Moreover, the settlement has avoided a proposed Superfund listing 
that would certainly provoke GE to wage a serious legal battle chal-
lenging everything from the legality of CERCLA to the scientific 
evidence behind the view that PCBs are harmful. 349 Such litigation 
would stall the clean-up process and cost EPA roughly $10 million in 
legal expenses.350 The settlement agreement has escaped this legal 
black hole while maintaining the threat of a possible Superfund listing 
to ensure GE's cooperation.35! 
Similar to RCRA or a voluntary clean-up program, the settlement 
agreement has allowed GE and EPA to negotiate the clean-up stand-
ards for each portion of the remediation project.352 Since the parties 
did not have to adhere to CERCLA's inflexible and stringent clean-up 
344 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(c)(3) (1994); Demeo, supra note 208, at 523-24; Cohen, supra note 3, at B2. 
345 See PCB Deal, supra note 184, at 1. 
346 See ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 199, at 14; John, supra note 99, at 975; U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 193, at 2. 
347 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 10; Angelo, supra note 8, at 44; 
Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1. 
348 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 6-8, 10; John, supra note 99, at 
975; Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1. 
349 See PCB Deal, supra note 184, at 1. 
350 See id. 
351 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 10; PCB Deal, supra note 184, 
at 1. 
352 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 2-6; Buzbee, supra note 92, at 
41-42. 
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standard, they could negotiate varied clean-up standards consistent 
with the use of the property.363 This ensures that residential proper-
ties will be remediated to a degree that assures protection of human 
health, but properties that will always be put to industrial uses will 
not be remediated to a higher standard than necessary.364 The result 
is a cleanup that is cheaper, quicker, and allows earlier reuse and 
redevelopment of the site.366 Further, since the settlement agreement 
was among GE, state, and federal authorities, it eliminates the prob-
lem of possible continuing federal liability that accompanies voluntary 
cleanups.366 
The settlement agreement further encourages redevelopment of 
the GE Plant Site through its inclusion of the Brownfields Redevel-
opment and Economic Aid package.367 The importance of this provi-
sion cannot be underestimated for a city that desperately needs new 
jobs to revitalize its economy.368 If the GE site had been placed under 
the CERCLA regime, it would not only be many years before a new 
company could occupy the site, but it is very likely that most compa-
nies would shy away in fear of potentialliability.369 Moreover, many 
believed that the stigma of a Superfund site would provoke the flight 
of Pittsfield's major employers, such as GE Plastics, General Dynam-
ics, and K-B Toys.36o The settlement avoids the problems inherent in 
a Superfund listing while eliminating the potential for future federal 
liability that accompanies a cleanup effected under a state brownfields 
statute.361 Again, since the agreement was reached among GE, state 
and federal authorities, there is no possibility that a subsequent pur-
chaser could be entangled in the CERCLA regime.362 
353 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9621(d) (1994); John, supra note 99, at 975. 
364 See John, supra note 99, at 975. 
355 See id. at 973, 975. 
356 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 1; Berger et aI., supra note 143, 
at 95-96. 
357 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 8. 
358 See Greg Sukiennik, Settlement Benefits Projects Countywide, Renewed Confidence in 
Pittsfield's Future, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 19. 
359 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 28; Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 149-50. 
360 See Breakthrough on PCBs, supra note 128, at 1. 
361 See Andrew, supra note 214, at 28; Berger et al., supra note 143, at 95-96; Rubenstein, 
supra note 190, at 149-50. 
362 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 29, at 1; Berger et aI., supra note 143, 
at 95-96. 
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CONCLUSION 
The negotiated settlement agreement between EPA's Intergovern-
mental Team and GE is a solution that ensures that Pittsfield's envi-
ronmental and economic health will be protected. Although it was a 
long time coming, the negotiators should be credited for thinking 
outside the box and creating a settlement that seems to please all 
interested parties. The settlement agreement has incorporated the 
best elements of the two federal regulatory schemes, RCRA and 
CERCLA, and has borrowed from alternatives to these schemes that 
are not yet widely used for sites of this magnitude. The agreement 
will ensure that GE remediates the GElHousatonic River Site to 
levels that protect humans and the environment in an expeditious and 
cost efficient manner, and that the plant site is redeveloped to return 
jobs and industry to a city that desperately needs it. 
